Supreme Court clarifies interplay of S.195 CrPC and police probe; holds obstruction under S.186 IPC not confined to physical force

A bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan heard Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 12373 of 2025 challenging a Delhi High Court order that upheld a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate’s direction to register an FIR under Sections 186 and 341 IPC. The petition raised two core issues: whether obstruction under Section 186 required use of criminal force or only an impediment to a public servant, and whether Section 195 CrPC barred court cognizance or police investigation in such cases where a complaint was lodged by a judicial officer.

The Court declined to quash the FIR but issued clear legal clarifications. It held that the term “obstruct” in Section 186 IPC was not confined to physical obstruction and need not involve criminal force; any act that unlawfully impeded a public servant in discharge of lawful duties could attract Section 186. The Court also clarified that Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC barred the court from taking cognizance of offences listed therein unless a written complaint by the public servant concerned (or his administrative superior) existed, but that the bar operated at the stage of taking cognizance and did not, in principle, prevent the police from investigating a cognizable or non‑cognizable offence under Section 156(3) CrPC. The Court, in its reasoning, observed: The Court further noted that “asking the police to investigate the complaint under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. … was a very serious error that the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate could be said to have committed,” emphasising that the CMM ought to have taken cognizance and issued process under Section 204 CrPC where appropriate.

Background The dispute arose when a process server, Shri Ravi Dutt Sharma, alleged that on 3 October 2013 he was prevented from executing a warrant and a summons at PS Nand Nagri, was abused by the SHO, made to stand with hands raised and to sit on the floor for several hours, and given only photocopies of the processes. The Administrative Civil Judge of Shahdara filed a complaint under Section 195 CrPC to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate; the CMM directed registration of an FIR under Sections 186 and 341 IPC and ordered investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC by an ACP‑rank officer. The petitioner (the SHO) challenged that order in revision and before the High Court; both forums rejected his pleas and the High Court found prima facie obstruction and upheld the direction for FIR registration.

Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that Section 186 required use of criminal force and that the magistrate lacked competence to direct investigation without a complaint under Section 195. The Supreme Court reviewed precedent (including State of U.P. v. Suresh Chandra Srivastava, Iqbal Singh Marwah, Raj Singh, M. Narayandas and Daulat Ram) and surveyed authorities construing “obstruction.” It held that obstruction need not be violent and that courts must guard against attempts to evade Section 195 by relabeling offences; conversely, Section 195 did not automatically bar police investigation at the initial stage. The Court declined to interfere with earlier orders but observed that if a chargesheet were filed, the petitioner could raise the bar under Section 195 before the trial court; the petition was disposed with that liberty. The Registry was directed to circulate the judgment to all High Courts.

Case No.: 2025 INSC 1009 (Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 12373 of 2025) Case Title: DEVENDRA KUMAR v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR. Appearances: For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Nikilesh Ramachandran, Advocate For the Respondent(s): (Names not recorded in the judgment)