High Court Conviction Upheld Where First Dying Declaration and Forensic Evidence Corroborated It

A bench of Justices Rajesh Bindal and Vipul M. Pancholi heard an appeal against the Gujarat High Court’s decision that set aside a trial court’s acquittal and convicted the accused for murder under Section 302 IPC. The appeal challenged the High Court’s reliance on a dying declaration recorded by a treating doctor and attendant documentary evidence to overturn the trial court’s benefit of doubt.

The Court dismissed the appeal and held that the High Court had rightly interfered with the trial court’s acquittal, finding that the first dying declaration and corroborative material left only one possible view. The Court noted that the deceased had told the doctor that “my aunt-in-law, Jemaben poured kerosene on me and set ablaze” and later explained the alleged motive, stating that she was burnt because she refused to go with a person at the behest of the accused. The judgment further recorded the medical finding that the “whole body and clothing having kerosene smelling burns about 100%” and reliance on a panchnama which recovered a kerosene container and soil with the smell of kerosene from the hut. The Court, in its reasoning, observed: Background The prosecution alleged that on the intervening night of 29–30 November 2004 the accused and a co-accused conspired to kill the deceased, who was sleeping in her hut with her four-year-old son. The case arose when the deceased was admitted to Civil Hospital, Palanpur with severe burn injuries and she later died on 4 December 2004. The complaint was lodged on 5 December 2004 and a chargesheet followed, accusing the persons of offences including Sections 302, 307, 436, 34, 120B IPC and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951.

The trial court acquitted both accused primarily on perceived discrepancies in three dying declarations. The State challenged that acquittal before the High Court, which allowed the appeal in part, convicted the appellant for murder under Section 302 IPC and sentenced her to life imprisonment with a fine of ₹10,000 (one month’s simple imprisonment in default). The appellant then approached the Supreme Court.

On appeal, the State urged that multiple dying declarations must be considered on their independent merits and that the first statement recorded by the independent treating doctor (PW‑3), and noted in the doctor’s yadi to police, was reliable and corroborated by medical certificates, post-mortem findings and panchnama which revealed kerosene smell and an empty kerosene container. The defence relied on discrepancies in the dying declarations and urged that the trial court’s acceptance of those discrepancies warranted acquittal.

The Supreme Court examined the evidence and agreed with the High Court that the first dying declaration to PW‑3, corroborated by independent documentary and physical evidence, could not be discarded merely because later statements varied in minor respects. The Court followed and applied this Court’s precedent in Nallam Veera Stayanandam (2004) to hold that the High Court legitimately set aside the trial court’s acquittal. The appeal was dismissed and the conviction and sentence imposed by the High Court were sustained.

Case Details: Case No.: 2025 INSC 1268 (Criminal Appeal No. 1934 of 2017) Case Title: Jemaben v. The State of Gujarat Appearances: For the Petitioner(s): Not indicated in the reported judgment For the Respondent(s): Not indicated in the reported judgment